The arguments of Van Niekerk and Van Zyl that, on the grounds that it involves an inappropriate commodification and alienation of women 's labour, commercial surrogate motherhood (CSM) is morally suspect are discussed and considered to be defective. In addition, doubt is cast on the notion that CSM should be illegal.
Introduction
Van Niekerk and Van Zyl give the answer "Yes" to their following two questions. "[Is there] anything intrinsically immoral about surrogacy arrangements from the perspective of the surrogate mother herself'?"' "Is there anything intrinsic to women's reproductive labour that should keep us from commodifying it or turning it into a form of 'alienated labour'?"2 I suspect that when they say "keep us", they are not talking merely about ethical considerations which might keep them from being involved with commercial surrogate motherhood but that they have in mind legislation also affecting the rest of us.
Van Niekerk and Van Zyl argue explicitly that commercial surrogate motherhood (CSM) is immoral. The impression might well be given that they present thereby implicitly a case for considering that it should be illegal. I 
Immorality and illegality
There is nothing intrinsically immoral about many activities which are rightly illegal. For Even if CSM is immoral, there might be a good case for refraining from making it illegal. It might be undesirable to have a law against X even if, even in the absence of such a law, X is immoral.
There are costs and consequences of passing, having and trying to enforce legislation. These costs and consequences are sometimes not worth bearing. They are often unpredicted and unintended. It would be a mistake to assume that the effect of illegalising X will necessarily be to make occurrences of X less frequent. For Even if CSM is intrinsically immoral it does not follow that it should be illegal.
The consequences of making CSM illegal might well be undesirable. Suppose that CSM is made illegal. CSM might still occur. What will be the consequences of illegal CSM? They might be different from the consequences of CSM as such just as, for instance, the consequences of prohibition were different from the consequences of normal, legal alcohol production, sale and consumption.
Making, for instance, speeding, illegal similarly does not necessarily reduce instances of speeding but, dissimilarly, it does not produce a black market for speeding whatever other consequences it might have. Of course, the risks of creating a black market for CSM might be worth taking and, overall, it might be a good idea to make CSM illegal but all this would not follow necessarily from the Once you become, say, married, you cannot always regard your own body and your own life in the same way you could when you were single. When you voluntarily become pregnant you cannot always regard your own body and your own life in the same way that you could before you were pregnant. If you become party to a contract pregnancy, then you cannot always regard your body and your pregnancy in the same way that you could if you did not involve yourself in such an arrangement. You might change your mind after you have agreed to part with the baby: your feelings about the CSM agreement might develop contrary to your own predictions concerning them. All this is true enough but it does not seem a reason for disfavouring such contractual and quasicontractual arrangements: it is, rather, a sort of description of them and, perhaps, a warning against entering into them too lightly.
I am not convinced that commercial surrogate motherhood "commodifies" people nor necessarily, say, undermines the moral autonomy proper to women nor the dignity and respect due to them. To treat reproductive labour as if it were a mere commodity would, no doubt, be to "degrade" it but it is far from clear that CSM need involve treating the reproductive labour, far less the "labourer", as a mere commodity.
Different contexts
People can have a cluster of attitudes towards the same thing or activity: they can value the same thing or activity differently in different contexts; they can value the same thing in similar contexts in different ways. If people pay a woman for her services in, say, carrying a fetus they are, in some respects, treating the service as a "commodified" one but it does not follow that they are necessarily treating it merely as that and it certainly does not follow that they need consider the surrogate mother or the carried child as being -any more than other mothers and other children -commodities. We might pay a taxi-driver to convey a heavy trunk, a mother and a child from one part of town to another: is this necessarily to treat a woman and/or a baby as if it were a trunk or a trunk as if it were a human being? Is it to treat the taxi driver as if she were a mere commodity or a mere aspect of a commodified service? It 
Social meaning
The surrogate mother "becomes" no such thing. In some respects she -or, rather, her body -is, or is like an "environment" and a "human incubator" (as is, in some respects, any potential mother's body).
What is immoral about that? In other respects, given that she is a human being, she is quite unlike an inanimate environment or incubator. She never is and never could become a mere "environment" nor a mere "human incubator". Van Niekerk and Van Zyl stress that there is a "social meaning" to pregnancy. They say: "As we have indicated above, the distinguishing feature of human pregnancies is that they may also entail a conscious knowledge of the significance of this physiological state and an active expectation of, and preparation for, the birth of a child. Although it is hardly 'natural' or 'normal' for a person to develop this kind of perspective on her (or his) pregnancy, we can all recognise that it is good. Yet contract pregnancies are geared towards keeping the surrogate from experiencing pregnancy and childbirth in this way. Instead, it asks the surrogate to relinquish her ability to interpret and control the meaning or significance of her reproductive labour".4
Why need there be only one interpretation of one's pregnancy which is appropriate? Might there not be, in particular, feelings, interpretations and meanings appropriate to commercial surrogate motherhood which are different from those appropriate to other pregnancies? Obviously, if someone agrees to become a commercial surrogate mother then she is not "free" to imagine that she has not become a commercial surrogate mother nor "free" to interpret her pregnancy as the pregnancy of a non-surrogate mother. Such is the nature of contracts. That is a reason why such arrangements should be undertaken thoughtfully: it is not a reason for thinking that CSM is immoral nor for wanting to ban it. To make CSM illegal would be to prohibit mothers from making other particular interpretations of their pregnancy which they might (and sometimes do) want to make.
Van Niekerk and Van Zyl write:
"Thus, instead of saying that reproductive labour is group.bmj.com on June 23, 2017 -Published by http://jme.bmj.com/ Downloaded from the most integral part of the female identity (as Pateman does), one can rather claim that the bond between a pregnant woman and her child is usually (or should be) an integral part of her pregnancy".3
In the case of commercial surrogate motherhood, perhaps such a bond is not and should not be integral to the pregnancy.
"Because surrogacy arrangements by definition involve more than two people, all of whom can legitimately claim that s/he is the parent of the child, a conflict can in principle always arise about who should assume parental rights and responsibilities towards the child. It seems that this is a problem inherent to surrogacy arrangements, since one can never be certain that such a conflict will not arise. For instance too, it can count against the advisability of making an action a crime that the resulting law cannot be or will not be enforced and that deviations from the resulting law cannot or will not be appropriately punished. Sometimes, the effects of the non-enforcement of particular legislation, including resultant disrespect for other potentially more readily enforceable legislation, is such that its non-existence would be preferable even when the law would be a very good law were it to be enforced. I suspect that much traffic legislation comes into this category. Perhaps the scarcely enforced and littleregarded British speed limits should be abolished: they could be replaced by recommendations and dangerous and reckless speeding could be prosecuted as dangerous or reckless driving. Yet, the complication arises that even when a law is a bad one in the sense that it would have been better not to have formulated it in the first place, its repeal, after it has been long established, can have bad consequences. Perhaps the repeal now of the speeding legislation would lead some people to drive more dangerously than they now do in the erroneous belief that vehicle speed was no longer of legal or ethical importance. Legislation is, indeed, a messy business.
When, precisely, in general, something is immoral and when, precisely, in general, something should be illegal, I make no pretence to know. Perhaps CSM is immoral. Perhaps, whether or not it is immoral, it should be illegal. I do not think that it is immoral and nor do I think that it should be illegal. That Hugh VMcLachlan, MA, PhD, is Lecturer in Sociology in the Department of Social Sciences, Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow.
